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This essay is a response to an article by Paul Robinson, Joshua Barton, and
Matthew Lister in this issue of New Criminal Law Review that criticizes an
article I authored with Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein entitled Putting Desert in
Its Place, which was itself an analysis ofseveral works published by Robinson
and various coauthors making the case for "empirical desert." Robinson's sug-
gestion that utility can be optimized by a focus on desert as it is viewed by the
average citizen opens up a new line of inquiry that could lead to a better
appreciation of the influence desert should have on the criminal law. Where
we disagree is how much utility a system founded on empirical desert is likely to
have. Robinson appears to hold that failing to subscribe to empirical desert in
most cases will result in noticeable disutility, whereas I am inclined to believe,
consistent with the studies in Putting Desert in Its Place, that only significant,
continuous and highly publicized departures from lay views will occasion the
loss of compliance and cooperation that Robinson describes. This article also
defends the punishment scheme that I have called "preventive justice" against
some of the claims made by Robinson, Barton, and Lister.
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INTRODUCTION
In this issue of New Criminal Law Review, Paul Robinson, Joshua Barton,
and Matthew Lister (RBL) respond to an article I authored with Lauren
Brinkley-Rubinstein entitled Putting Desert in its Place,' which was itself an
analysis of several works published by Robinson and various coauthors
making the case for "empirical desert." 2 I am grateful for the opportunity
to provide this brief analysis of the criticisms that RBL levy at Putting
Desert in Its Place. Some of those criticisms are well-founded or raise issues
that our article could or should have more directly addressed. Other criti-
cisms exaggerate or miss the mark entirely. This article will assume that the
reader is familiar with both Putting Desert in Its Place and with RBL's
article, entitled Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, and Limiting
Retributivism: A Reply.' Thus, Parts II and III of this article will be devoted
to responding directly to RBL's comments, without significant background
explanation. However, in this introduction and in Part I two preliminary
matters are taken up.
Most importantly, I want to emphasize the most significant points of
agreement and disagreement between RBL and myself.4 One goal of
Putting Desert in Its Place was to highlight the contribution that Paul
Robinson and his coauthors have made to the analysis of criminal justice
policy. The conflict between deontological retributivists and utilitarians
over the purpose and scope of the substantive criminal law will never end.5
i. Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place, 65
STANFORD L. REV. 77 (2012).
2. See, in particular, PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED How MUCH? 139-40 (2008); Paul H. Robinson &
Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions ofjustice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829
(2007); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions oflustice: Implications for Criminal
Law and justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. I (2007).
3. Paul Robinson, Joshua Barton, & Matthew Lister, Empirical Desert, Individual Pre-
vention, and Limiting Retributivism: A Reply, 17, N. CRIM. L REV. 312-75 (204).
4. Because Professor Brinkley-Rubinstein's contribution to Putting Desert in Its Place
was primarily statistical, this response reflects only my views, which are not necessarily hers.
5. RBL state that Putting Desert in Its Place grandiosely asserts that this debate has been
supplanted by the debate between us and RBL. RBL, supra note 3, at 353 (stating that such
an assertion would be "a great shock" to moral philosophers). Of course, our article says no
such thing; it merely distinguishes between the "old" and "new" debates on criminal justice,
the first pitting deontologists against utilitarians, the second pitting utilitarians against one
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But Robinson's suggestion that utility can be optimized by a focus on
desert as it is viewed by the average citizen opens up a new line on inquiry
that could lead to a better appreciation of the influence desert should have on
the criminal law. If departure from empirical desert has the criminogenic and
de-legitimizing effects Robinson posits, then both utilitarians and deontol-
ogists should pause before advocating something different-utilitarians for
obvious reasons, deontologists because such damaging consequences call
into question the logic of their moral stances. If instead the effects of depart-
ing from empirical desert are minimal, then desert theorists will have one less
nagging doubt about the real-world impact of their philosophizing, and
utilitarians can rest easier about implementing more direct crime prevention
policies. As someone who distrusts anyone's ability to fathom, through
philosophical musings, the morally correct degree of blame that should be
attributed to particular offenders, I applaud Robinson for operationalizing
desert in a way that is commensurate with consequentialism.
Where we disagree is how much utility a system founded on empirical
desert is likely to have. Robinson appears to hold that failing to subscribe to
empirical desert in most cases will result in noticeable disutility, whereas I
am inclined to believe, in line with the studies reported in Putting Desert in
Its Place, that only significant, continuous and highly publicized departures
from lay views will occasion the loss of compliance, cooperation, and
respect that Robinson describes. People get upset about all sorts of things
government does-from Obamacare and surveillance to gun control and
abortion. Changing the official stance on controversial issues to appease
one group is likely to upset another. Whether the focus is criminal matters
or something else, most people will not take their disgruntlement out on
the system or on others, and those who do will be roughly equal in number
regardless of which position government adopts.
1. ON PREVENTIVE JUSTICE
Before looking at RBL's specific critiques of the studies in Putting Desert in
Its Place, I also want to clear away some underbrush, sown in RBL's article,
about "preventive justice," so that the rest of this article can focus on the
another. See Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note i, at 78-79 ("In the new debate
both sides are... willing to abandon the deontological view of desert.").
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main issues. "Preventive justice" is the term I used in Putting Desert in Its
Place to describe the position that incapacitation, specific deterrence, and
rehabilitation-what I call the individual prevention factors-should play
the dominant role in fashioning dispositions in criminal cases, with desert
relevant only at the guilt adjudication stage and as a loose limitation on
the minimum and maximum terms for sentences.' It was not the intent of
Putting Desert in Its Place to mount a comprehensive defense of this
approach to criminal justice, a task I have undertaken elsewhere.' None-
theless, in their article RBL proffer several criticisms of preventive justice to
which I want to (very briefly) respond. Their key criticisms, all closely
related, are that preventive justice is: (i) an oxymoron;' (2) pure preventive
detention in disguise9 ; and (3) inadequate as a utilitarian theory, because it
fails to take into account general deterrence or the differences among
incapacitation, specific deterrence, and rehabilitation as goals of
punishment.10
Along with deontological retributivists, Robinson and his coauthors
think that desert and justice are synonymous, and that utilitarian goals
(other than empirical desert) are seeking something other than justice." As
I have noted elsewhere, however:
Justice does not have to be defined solely in terms of blameworthiness and
offense gravity. Determinate sentencing is unjust to the victim [who is hurt
by someone] who has been released prematurely, as well as to the prema-
turely released offender who must now suffer avoidable punishment for
6. See Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note I, at 79-
7. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary Goal of Sentencing, 48 SAN
DIEGo L. REV. 1127 (20H).
8. RBL, supra note 3, at 367 ("'individual prevention' ... allow[s] desert to be violated-
injustice can be done, in the name of prevention.").
9. Id. at362 ("'individual prevention'... thus simply provides useful window dressing to
make it look like something other than preventive detention's pure dangerousness.").
10. Id. at 362 ("As utilitarians, one would expect that SBR would be anxious to include
general deterrence in their proposed distributive principle") and 364 ("Unlike the other
coercive crime-control principles-special deterrence and rehabilitation-general deter-
rence cannot be made to quietly collapse into dangerousness, so it must be simply
dropped.").
n. See, e.g., RBL, supra note 3, at319 ('[D]oing justice.' involves assigning liability and
punishment "in ways that the community perceives as morally just, so-called 'empirical
desert.' Conversely, the system's moral credibility, and therefore its crime-control effective-
ness, is undermined if it deviates from the community's perceptions of just desert.").
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a crime the offender would not have committed had detention and treat-
ment continued. It is also unjust to the contrite offender who is ready to be
law-abiding but must serve out the sentence he or she "deserves."l 2
As James Whitman recently put it, "there are as many kinds of justice as
there are offenders." 1 3 Even if justice is tautologically defined in terms of
desert, an individual prevention regime can be "just." For instance, Dou-
glas Husak, a well-known retributivist, has argued that preventive deten-
tion is legitimate punishment so long as the factors upon which such
detention is based are "under the control" of the person detained, factors
that certainly include prior crimes and criminal affiliations, and could
include (although Husak would probably not do so) substance abuse and
intentional withdrawals from rehabilitative programs, all of which are
potent predictors.14
Consistent with their first criticism, RBL also advise that dressing up
preventive justice as "a sort of limiting retributivism" is an attempt to hide
the fact that what is really being proposed is pure preventive detention.' 5
Yet, as Putting Desert in Its Place indicated,' 6 a preventive justice regime
would not focus on individual prevention to the exclusion of desert.
Rather, sentences would need to fall within desert-based ranges, albeit
extremely broad ones. Because those ranges would exist out of concern
about the criminogenic effect of paying no attention to desert, the result
could also accurately be described as a form of limiting retributivism, albeit
not precisely the type envisioned by its progenitors.17
It is true that within those ranges, preventive considerations would
prevail. However, I would also resist being labeled a fan of prevention
12. Slobogin, supra note 7, at u6o.
13. James Whitman, The Case for Modern Penalism (forthcoming, 2014).
14. Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak: Preventive Detention as Punishment, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1173, 1195 (20II).
1y. RBL, supra note 3, at 368 (stating that preventive justice "is not a form of limiting
retributivism").
16. Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note i, at 122 ("[Tlhe best way to reconcile
retributive and preventive goals is probably through some sort of limiting retributivism, or
what we are calling preventive justice, which allows utilitarian considerations to have
significant impact within a range established by retributive principles.").
17. Slobogin, supra note 7, at u65 (noting that the proposed system would differ from the
typical approach to "limiting retributivism" because "no particular minimum sentence
would be required, the sentence range would be broader, and most importantly, risk would
be determined at the back end by an expert panel rather than at the front end by a judge.")
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detention; the more accurate term is preventive intervention." As I have
laid out in other work, a well-functioning preventive regime would be
governed by a number of principles-among them the legality principle,
the least-drastic-means principle, and the risk proportionality principle-
that would interact to make detention impossible in the absence of a crime,
rare in minor criminal cases, a last resort in all cases, and proportional to the
risk presented.' 9
Ironically, Robinson, who has proposed a detention system for indivi-
duals deemed to be dangerous, appears to be more receptive to pure
preventive detention than me. 20 Unlike Robinson, I would not permit
such detention separate from the criminal justice system except when it
is limited to a very narrowly defined group of "undeterrable" individuals
whose autonomy, or whose willingness to exercise their autonomy in the
right direction, is seriously compromised. 2 1 The failure of Robinson's
proposal to adopt a similar limitation very likely renders it unconstitu-
tional.2 2 More importantly in the context at issue here, if, as Robinson
claims (but I dispute), detention inconsistent with empirical desert usu-
ally has de-legitimizing effects, I doubt that, as Robinson further
claims, 23 relegating it to a separate entity or avoiding attachment of the
word "justice" to it will change matters, especially if this separate regime
results in confinement of anyone thought to meet the dangerousness
threshold.
18. See Christopher Slobogin, A jurisprudence ofDangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. I, 14
(2003) ("The second essential feature of preventive detention-or what might more aptly be
called preventive intervention-is that the nature of the liberty deprivation must bear
a reasonable relationship to the harm feared.").
19. Slobogin, supra note 7, at ui30-53.
20. Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
CriminalJustice, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1429, 1454 (2001) (arguing for a system of post-sentence
preventive detention that would be "segregated" from the criminal justice system).
z1. For my most recent treatment of this issue, see Preventive Detention in the United
States and Europe, in PREVENTING DANGER 137, 149-52 (Michele Caianello & Michael
Corrado eds., 2013).
zz. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,360 (997) (holding that due process requires
a "lack of volitional control" as well as dangerousness before post-sentence commitment
may take place).
23. See RBL, supra note 3, at 351 ("a society... need not undercut the criminal law's
moral credibility... if it will simply be honest about what it is doing, that it is doing it as
part of a civil preventive detention system, no longer claiming it is doing criminal justice.").
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Finally, RBL take me to task for not being sufficiently nuanced in my
utilitarianism. They fault me for ignoring general deterrence as a consider-
ation in fashioning sentences and for lumping together incapacitation,
specific deterrence, and rehabilitation under the dangerousness rubric.24
I plead guilty, more or less. Although general deterrence is an important
goal of the criminal justice system, it should not drive criminal justice
policy, at least where run-of-the-mill street crime is involved. As I have
stated in other work (citing Robinson), "research strongly suggests that for
most offenders concern about punishment has very little impact on the
decision to commit crime."2 5 I have also argued that the uncertainty
associated with an indeterminate sentencing regime, along with the likeli-
hood that sentences in such a regime would be enhanced for multiple
offenses, may well be a superior general deterrent to desert-based sentenc-
ing.26 In short, a regime focused on individual prevention can usually
achieve whatever general deterrence effect is possible. But preventive justice
also posits that, even when that is not the case, individual prevention goals
and, in particular, the risk proportionality principle, should typically gov-
ern. Put another way, general deterrence only has independent effect when
it results in sentences that are disproportionate to either desert or risk;
Robinson resists the first result, I reject the second.
RBL are also correct that, consistent with the principles noted above (to wit,
the legality, least-drastic mean, and risk proportionality principles), preventive
justice would focus on the best way to prevent an individual from committing
another crime, and that this focus would mean that the central concerns are
dangerousness and coercive intervention 27 (although, along with most social
scientists, I prefer the terms "risk" and "risk management" 28 ). It must also be
24. See supra note o.
25. Slobogin, supra note 7, at n63.
26. Id. See also Tom Baker, Alon Harel, & Tamara Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in
Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 445-46 (2004); Naomi Harlin
Goodno, Career Criminals Targeted: The Verdict Is In, California 's Three Strikes Law Proves
Effective, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 461, 469-71 (2007) (describing studies purporting
to find that California's three-strikes law has had a significant deterrent effect).
27. RBL, supra note 3, at 360 ("SBR's undisclosed assumption appears to be that all three
of the principles-special deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation of the dangerous-
in practice collapse into dangerousness because, after all, there is no need for rehabilitation
or for special deterrence unless the offender is presently dangerous.").
28. See Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, y8 VAND. L. REV.
I2I, 127-28 (2005) (defining these terms).
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recognized, however, that risk can be reduced through numerous mechan-
isms: detention, treatment, restorative processes, and other options as varied
as the individuals who offend, are all viable possibilities. The goal, which
contrary to RBL's insinuation I have never tried to hide, is ascertaining the
best means of reducing a particular individual's risk, through whatever
legitimate means is available. Under such a system, RBL are wrong to call
"false" the assumption that "there is no need for rehabilitation or for special
deterrence unless the offender is presently dangerous." 29
None of this is meant to deny that a system based on preventive justice/
individual prevention/preventive intervention is controversial. There is
a strong and understandable revulsion toward government incarceration
of people based on suspect predictions of risk, 30 as evidenced by the largely
negative reaction to film dramatizations of preventive notions like prepun-
ishment, detention based on genetic makeup, and behavioral modification
programs. 31 However, preventive justice as I envision it would not be the
gulag portrayed in Minority Report, the movie that RBL reference in dis-
cussing an individual prevention regime. 32 As I stated in one of my more
recent efforts, a system of preventive justice could be "similar to the original
Model Penal Code's scheme, which established wide sentencing ranges for
felonies that all began at one year and increased in breadth according to
crime severity, with the caveat that even a one-year sentence could be
reduced in light of the crime and the history and character of the defen-
dant."3 3 Because risk would play the dominant role in disposition, no
particular minimum sentence would be required, the sentence range would
be much broader than a desert-based system would contemplate, and the
actual maximum sentence would be determined at the back end by an
expert panel rather than by a judge at the front end. 34 Granted, the recently
29. RBL, supra note 3, at 360.
30. RBL rightly highlight the fact that risk assessment is not an exact science. Id. at 30.
But neither is culpability assessment. See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 1154-58 (detailing this
and other responses to the inaccuracy criticism).
31. The references are to the movies Minority Report, Gattaca, and Clockwork Orange,
respectively.
32. RBL, supra note 3, at 364 (in discussing an individual prevention regime, stating,
"think of Tom Cruise in Minority Report, but without the ability to accurately predict future
criminality").
33. Slobogin, supra note 7, at u65.
34. See also Daniel Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice,
8o CAL. L. REV. 317, 351 (1992) (describing Japan's criminal justice system of "specific
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revised Model Penal Code sentencing provisions, heavily influenced by
retributivists, have abandoned this framework. 35 But the fact that an inde-
terminate scheme of the type I prefer was at one time endorsed by the
American Law Institute will hopefully tone down any kneejerk reaction to
preventive justice based on Hollywood images.
RBL assert that indeterminate sentencing of the type adopted by the
original Code, which was prevalent before the 1970s, is a "failed" policy, 36
noting that in the past few decades a number of states have moved toward
determinate sentencing.3 7 Of course, a number of states have not," and
determinate sentencing has many flaws as well.39 Furthermore, the data
are, at best, unclear about which type of sentencing regime-determinate
or indeterminate-is most effective at reducing crime.40 In short, experi-
ence to date does not make the case that, from a utilitarian perspective,
prevention" as focused on rehabilitation and prevention of recidivism, with the result that it
prescribes "very broad sentences" that "can be suspended for all but a very small handful of
crimes").
35. See Model Penal Code: Sentencing § I.02(2)(a) (approved July 2007) (requiring that
punishment be "within a range ofseverity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms
done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders").
36. RBL, supra note, at 312 (abstract).
37. See id., text accompanying nn.175-76.
38. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved
Policy Issues, 1o COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1196-97 (2005) (noting that 18 states plus the federal
government have adopted sentencing guidelines that tend in the direction of determinate
sentencing, but that a number of states have also rejected the guidelines approach).
39. See Joan Petersilia, California 's Correction Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, in 37
CRIME AND JUSTICE 207, 252-53 (Michael Tonry ed., zoo8) ("Under California's deter-
minate sentencing regime a large percentage of Californians who are nonviolent criminals
are accumulating very extensive criminal records... [yet] may not be any more dangerous
than offenders in other states who are left 'on the street' and successfully handled through an
array of community-based intermediate sanctions. [At the same time], California's sentenc-
ing system also released violent offenders who amass lengthy criminal records-individuals
who, in a system more carefully tailored to protect public safety, probably should not have
been released in the first place.").
40. See, e.g., Yan Zhang, Lening Zhang, & Michael S. Vaughn, Indeterminate and
Determinate Sentencing Models: A State-Specific Analysis of Their Effects on Recidivism, C RI ME
& DELINQUENCY I (Dec. 8, 2009), http://cad.sagepub.com/content/early/2009/12/08/ooni
128 7 09 354047.full.pdf+html (finding that mandatory parole release-in essence, determi-
nate sentencing-turned out to be worse than discretionary parole release at reducing
recidivism in New York and North Carolina, better than discretionary release at reducing
reoffending in Maryland and Virginia, and of no apparent effect in Texas and Oregon).
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determinate, desert-based sentencing is superior to indeterminate,
prevention-based sentencing.
RBL suggest, however, that truly preventive justice must go beyond the
indeterminate sentencing practices of the original Model Penal Code
because, if reduction of individual risk is the goal, neither a predicate act
nor any maximum limits should be imposed; rather, intervention should
occur whenever a person is dangerous and should last as long as the danger
persists. 4 ' I have already noted the reasons I resist this Minority Report
regime. First is the aforementioned legality principle, which, as I construe
it, prohibits deprivations of liberty in the absence of harmful conduct that
is clearly defined by statute. 42 Second, my intuition, which I admit is
merely that, is that doing away with a conduct requirement, basic mens
rea requirements, and sentencing ranges loosely based on ordinal desert
would occasion the harms envisioned by Robinson. 43 This much of a bow
to desert is needed to avoid the type of disrespect for decent behavior and
government authority that would increase criminal behavior and the ability
to prevent it. However, the point of Putting Desert in Its Place and this
article is that these negative effects are unlikely to occur in a more cabined
preventive justice regime.
With this background, we can now turn to the issues that were the focus
of Putting Desert in Its P/ace. The research in that article was organized under
three inquiries that I take to be crucial to empirical desert theory. First, is
there enough agreement among laypeople about the role desert should play
in fashioning punishment to make a system of punishment based on their
views viable (the consensus inquiry)? Second, will a departure from the
consensus view on punishment reduce compliance and cooperation with the
41. RBL, supra note 3, text accompanying n.i62 and at 364 (asserting that the limitation
of preventive justice to sentencing is a "maneuver" designed to "obscure" its true theoretical
reach).
42. See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 1133 ("the practical consequence of the legality principle
is that preventive detention may not occur unless the individual has committed a crime-
presumably defined at least in part consistent with desert-or has engaged in conduct that
poses an imminent risk of crime.").
43. Cf RBL, supra note 3, at 365 ("No one would want to live under a system where
'punishment' is imposed upon a mere prediction of future criminality."). RBL state that I
have only recently "evolved" to this position, citing an article I wrote in 2005. RBL, supra
note 3, at n.149. But that article was in the nature of a thought experiment. See Slobogin,
supra note 28, at 130 (stating that the article was "exploratory") and 168 (noting concerns
about the proposal related to empirical desert).
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system (the compliance inquiry)? Third, will the preventive effects of adher-
ence to desert exceed the preventive effects of a system based on preventive
justice (the crime control inquiry)? As Putting Desert in Its Place noted, the
third question is very difficult to answer, and in fact our research did not even
seek to answer it." Instead, the studies described under that rubric investi-
gated the role that lay people think preventive goals should play in fashioning
punishment, and thus related more closely to the first inquiry. Accordingly,
the discussion below first addresses, in Part II, what our research showed
with respect to lay views about the relative importance of desert and pre-
vention, and then examines, in Part III, what our research showed about the
effects of failing to adhere to desert.
II. LAY VIEWS ON THE RELEVANCE
OF PREVENTIVE GOALS
In Putting Desert in Its Place, our first study found that consensus about the
ordinal rankings of crimes can sometimes change if subjects are given infor-
mation not only about the actus reus and mens rea of the crime-the only
information Robinson and his coauthors give the subjects in their studies-
but also about offender characteristics. 5 More specifically, Study i found
that provision of information potentially relevant to an offender's risk and
treatability (individual prevention factors) led to significant differences in
the way subjects ranked four of the six pairs of scenarios we used in the
study.4 6 RBL state that this finding "has nothing to do with prior claims by
Robinson and coauthors."4 7 But Robinson has routinely insisted that
"[w]hen... asked to assign punishment, [lay persons] don't look to the
factors that determine dangerousness or deterrence, but rather to the offen-
der's moral blameworthiness."48 Study i suggests, unsurprisingly, that this
assertion is wrong. Desert certainly plays a role in lay persons' decisions
about punishment (a conclusion that a number of our studies support), but
44. Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note i, at 120 ("Our research does not
directly test [the crime control] hypothesis, which would be hard to do given the difficulty
of measuring the extent of crime control and its causes.").
45. Id. at 90.
46. Id. at 91.
47. RBL, supra note 3, at 333.
48. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIz. ST. L.J.
1089, uio5 (zon).
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it is not the sole consideration. If that is so, creating a criminal justice system
that orders punishment solely on the basis of desert may create dissatisfaction
with the criminal law, which is something Robinson wants to avoid.
However, RBL also state that the facts that we thought would suggest
a greater or lesser need for preventive sanctions-namely, prior crimes,
a willingness to undergo treatment, apology and restitution, and a vow
to recidivate-are also consistent with desert."9 Thus, they consider our
study a "poor test" of the influence of individual prevention factors.5 0
Several responses are in order here. First, although arguments can be made
that prior bad acts and (perhaps) apologies are pertinent to desert, most
definitions of the latter concept do not include such forward-looking facts
as a willingness to undergo treatment or a vow to recidivate." Indeed,
RBL's assertion about the relevance of our manipulation factors to desert
seems to be in direct conflict with the statement in another of Robinson's
articles, reported in Putting Desert in Its Place,52 that "extralegal punish-
ment factors" such as apology, remorse, and one's history of good or bad
deeds "go beyond the factors that the criminal law formally recognizes"
because they are not "desert-based factors" having to do with the "serious-
ness of the harm or the evil of the offense and an offender's culpability and
mental capacity."" Finally, if, contrary to these first two points, all of our
manipulation factors are consonant with RBL's definition of desert, then
RBL's definition is so capacious that in many cases it would eliminate any
meaningful distinction between desert and prevention-rather, empirical
desert and individual prevention could happily coexist much of the time,
a point to which I'll return below.
RBL do highlight one instance where their conception of desert would
conflict with prevention goals: the offender with mental illness.54 By most
accounts, mental illness makes a person less blameworthy; at the same time,
49. RBL, supra note 3, at 335 (stating that Study i's manipulations included "many
elements that prior research has shown affect people's judgment of deserved punishment").
50. Id.
51. LEO KATZ ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 63 (199) ("Retributive desert
is based on what the offender has done, and with what culpability.").
52. Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note I, at 91.
53. Paul H. Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness,
Hardship, Good Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary Factors in Assessing
Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737, 739 (2012).
54. RBL, supra note 3, at 335.
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it can be a significant risk factor.5 5 RBL are right that, in our effort to
ascertain the importance of desert in lay calculations of punishment, we
should have included a scenario involving an individual who clearly had
a mitigating mental condition that also strongly suggested dangerousness.
It is worth noting on this score, however, that precisely this "double-edge
sword" scenario frequently arises in capital cases, and that research routinely
finds that juries treat mental illness as an aggravating factor rather than
a mitigating one, even when dangerousness is not a statutory aggravator.5 6
That result suggests, once again, that desert is not always the overriding
consideration in punishment decisions.
Other studies we conducted point in the same direction. Study 6 found
that subjects given information about treatment programs and their relative
success were quite willing to reduce both the length of a sentence and the
extent to which it took place in prison.5 7 Studies 7A and 7 B found that,
when given information about treatability, a sizeable number of subjects
(well over 5o percent) were willing to endorse relatively indeterminate
sentencing ranges rather that determinate ones except where murder was
involved, and that even one-third to two-thirds of those who were not given
treatment information were willing to endorse relatively broad sentencing
ranges, again except for the most serious crimes.5 8 Even for serious crimes,
a significant percentage of our subjects in Study 7 C reduced the sentence
when given information that indicated a high degree of treatability (and
increased the sentence when given information about enhanced risk).5 9
RBL note, as we did in Putting Desert in Its Place,6 0 that our subjects'
choice of the relatively indeterminate range over the narrow determinate
range in Studies 7 A and 7 B might simply have reflected the fact that their
desert-based view of punishment did not fit within the narrow range
55. See Welsh S. White, A Deadly Dilemma: Choices by Attorneys Representing "Innocent"
Capital Defendants, 102 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2035 (2004) (noting that evidence of mental
illness is "double-edged" because whereas it can both "explain where the defendant has
come from and how he got to be the way he is, it also has the potential to... enhance the
danger to society").
56. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 88-90 (zoo6) (describing five studies to
that effect).
57. Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note I, at 113-14 (see in particular Table 5).
58. Id. at n6 (Table 6).
59. Id. at u18 (Table 7).
6o. Id. at u6.
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option." However, in both studies the determinate range centered around
the average desert-based sentence we had obtained for the same scenarios in
an earlier study, and thus should have been comparatively attractive, ifthe
subjects were focused solely on desert. 62 More importantly, the indetermi-
nate option made clear that the actual sentence served under that option
would depend entirely on an assessment of the offender's risk at the end of
the treatment program (i.e., every scenario in this condition stated that the
precise sentence would depend on "how well X responds to treatment"),
whereas the determinate option made clear that the offender's response to
treatment was irrelevant. 63 Those prompts signaled that prevention goals,
not desert, were at play in the indeterminate condition, and yet it was the
more popular option.
RBL insist, however, that rehabilitation "is not a good substitute for
giving people the punishment they deserve."64 At the same time, they state
that if subjects are told that "the offense is something for which the
offender can be treated ... the subjects are less likely to see the offense as
strictly the product of the offender's selfishness, greed, or indifference (to
others' interest or the law's demands)." 6 5 Later they state, "the greater the
effect of the treatment in altering [an offender's] likelihood of committing
another offense, the less he might be seen as accountable for his own
conduct in committing the offense."66 It is hard to know what to make
of these seemingly conflicting statements. Again, the latter two assertions
express a very expansive view of desert; certainly most sentencing regimes
that purport to be based on desert do not permit the sentencer to take into
account the possibility that treatment might reduce recidivism. 67 If instead
RBL are stating that our subjects might have reasoned the way RBL
describe, that seems unlikely. In Study 6, the subjects were simply told
that a recidivist was going to undergo a treatment that had been successful
61. RBL, supra note 3, at 373.
62. Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note 1, at 115.
63. Id. at 129-34 (Appendix C, providing descriptions of the prompts for studies 7 A and 7 B).
64. RBL, supra note 3, at 344 (emphasis removed).
65. Id. at 345.
66. Id. at 349.
67. See, e.g., z8 U.S.C. § 9 9 4 (k) ("The Commission shall insure that the guidelines
reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the
purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.").
390 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW I VOL. 17 NO. 2 1 SPRING 2014
in reducing recidivism; they were given no information about the subject's
treatability and thus were not likely to draw inferences about the offender's
individual blameworthiness from it.6 8 In Studies 7 A and 7 B, the subjects
were explicitly told, as noted above, that the actual sentence in the inde-
terminate condition would depend entirely on how well the offender re-
sponded to treatment, which is not something that can be known in
a desert-based regime where sentence is imposed upfront.6 9
Assume, however, that all of RBL's assertions about these studies are
correct, and that the determination of desert (both as a matter of theory and
as made by our subjects) includes an assessment of the extent to which
certain types of offenders can be induced to stop committing crime
through treatment or some other means. Then, once again, the disagree-
ment I have with RBL is reduced significantly. Under this conception of
desert, an offender for whom rehabilitation is possible could receive a sen-
tence much shorter than an offender for whom it is not-a result that is
consistent with preventive justice.
Of course, as both Putting Desert in Its Place and RBL point out, our
research also indicates that complete convergence between desert and pre-
ventive goals is not likely, even if RBL's expansive definition of desert is
adopted. 70 In Study 6 the subjects given treatment information on average
imposed more than two years of confinement over and above what was
needed for rehabilitation alone, indicating that desert, general deterrence,
or some other factor was influencing their decision.7 ' And in Study 7 C,
where we told our subjects not only that the individual would be subject to
a rehabilitation program but also that it was successful, some of our subjects
still wanted to keep the individual confined beyond completion of the
program, again either on desert or general deterrence grounds. 72
68. Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note i, at 129-34 (Appendix C, describing
prompts for Study 6).
69. Id. at 129-34.
70. See, e.g., id. at 114 (stating that the results of Study 6 suggest "that laypeople are
unwilling to abandon desert").
71. Id. (noting that whereas the treatment programs only required six months to a year to
complete, the subjects given treatment information on average imposed sentences from 2.4
to 3.9 years, depending on the scenario).
72. Id. at u8 (Table 7) (showing that the percentage of subjects unwilling to change their
sentence from a presumably desert-based disposition to a prevention-based disposition
ranged from 15% to 61%, depending on the scenario).
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Except in the case involving murder, however, most of our subjects in
Study 7 C were willing to change their original, desert-based sentence. In
cases involving a drug addict convicted of robbery (with two prior thefts),
a 17-year-old convicted of an armed robbery (with a prior aggravated
assault), and an adult convicted of bribery, the proportion of subjects who
substantially reduced their original desert-based sentence when given infor-
mation about successful treatment was 85 percent, 81 percent, and 73
percent, respectively.7 3 In the first two cases, most of our subjects were
willing to release the individual at the completion of the treatment program,
and in the third case almost half were willing to do so. 4
The greater willingness to abandon desert reflected in Study 7 C as
compared to Study 6 presumably had to do with the fact that, in the latter
study, the subjects did not know the outcome of the treatment. When,
instead, they were told that the treatment was successful, as occurred in
Study 7 C, they were more willing to subscribe to a disposition based solely
or substantially on a risk assessment.7 5 This reliance on a back-end deter-
mination of risk is antithetical to a desert-based regime but is precisely how
preventive justice would work.
The fact that our subjects were much less willing to consider preventive
factors in connection with the most serious crimes cannot be ignored,
however. In this setting, as we pointed out in Putting Desert in Its Place,
desert appeared to play a dominant role with our subjects, at least when the
information about risk suggested that the sentence should be reduced
rather than enhanced.7 6 Perhaps a risk management program for a treatable
serious offender could be structured in such a way-say, for instance,
73. Id. (Table 7, col. 4).
74. Id. (Table 7, col. 4 parenthetical) (showing the average reduction in sentence in these
cases to be 92%, 71%, and 44%, respectively). This column also shows that even in the case
involving murder, 39% of the subjects were willing to reduce the sentence by an average of
42% upon learning about a reduction in risk.
75. RBL validly criticize Study 7 C because of a possible demand effect (i.e., the possi-
bility that the subjects changed their sentences because they thought we wanted them to do
so). RBL, supra note 3, at 351. It should be noted, however, that for two of the six scenarios in
this study, a substantial percentage (48% and 6%) did not change the sentence.
76. For a scenario depicting a person convicted of grand theft (with priors for grant theft
auto and burglary) who did not successfully complete the rehabilitation program, over half
the subjects were willing to enhance the sentence (whereas only 16% of the subjects were
willing to do so when confronted with a three time-DUI offender who did not complete the
program).
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a relatively short prison term combined with a long parole supervision
process-that it would provide sufficient "punitive bite" and thus avoid
conflict with desert, a possibility noted by both RBL and by us in Putting
Desert in Its Place.7 7 But the existing research indicates that, to satisfy lay
views of desert, any crime deserving more than a two-year sentence must be
served in prison rather than the community.7 1 If that is so, then in cases
involving serious crime, desert is both a very important consideration and
not always reconciliable with prevention goals. The question then becomes
whether that inability to reconcile the two approaches to punishment has
real-world effects.
III. THE EFFECT OF DIVERGING FROM DESERT
(OR PREVENTION) ON ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR
TOWARD THE SYSTEM
A predicate question in determining whether divergence from desert has
negative effects is whether there is any desert-based consensus from which
to depart. Study 2 in Putting Desert in Its Place examined the extent to
which our subjects agreed on the precise punishment that should be meted
out.7 9 We found that, whether our subjects were provided solely with actus
reus/mens rea facts or with those facts plus additional information about
the offender, "disagreement ... about specific punishments ... was remark-
ably high."so For sixteen out of the twenty-four scenarios we used in the
study, the percentage of subjects at the modal value was only between 15
and 25 percent, and the range of punishment within two standard devia-
tions varied enormously in all twenty-four scenarios.8 1 Again, this finding
is not very surprising. But it suggested to us that using lay views to figure
out how much to punish would be a difficult endeavor.
77. See RBL, supra note 3, text accompanying nn.134-35; Slobogin & Brinkley-
Rubinstein, supra note i, at 12 n.138.
78. Robert E. Harlow, John M. Darley, & Paul H. Robinson, The Severity of Inter-
mediate Penal Sanctions: A Psychophysical Scaling Approach to Obtaining Community Per-
ceptions, ii J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 71, 86 (1995) (finding that "[n]o intermediate
sanctions were seen as equivalent to prison terms of 2 years or more").
79. Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note s, at 94.
8o. Id. at 95 (Table 2).
81. Id.
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RBL's response to this concern is that "[e]ven if community views on an
issue were expressed by a bell curve. . . the law's moral credibility could still
be improved by moving from a point on the tail of the curve to a point
nearer the center, since this would reduce the number of people with whose
intuitions the law conflicts and the extent of that conflict." 8 2 This is a valid
point, if the distribution obtained is a bell curve. But many of our dis-
tributions were nearly bi- or tri-modal (think of a histogram that looks like
a mouth with broken teeth) or very widely dispersed with thick tails.83
Moreover, as the studies already canvassed indicate, what RBL are calling
the "moral credibility" of the law may also hinge on the law's allegiance to
prevention factors, independently of desert factors. Finally, whatever the
factors are that influence lay punishment decisions about desert, they are so
numerous-especially under the capacious definition of desert that RBL
appear to adopt, which can include treatability and vows to recidivate-
that figuring out what the bell curve might be in a given case could be very
difficult without numerous additional studies of the type that Robinson
conducts. If, to counter that problem, a range is provided for generally
defined crimes like assault and theft, with individualized factors determin-
ing where within the range a particular punishment falls, the sentence in
any given case could well be far removed from the pinnacle of the curve
that would be obtained had the public been polled on the issue.
All of this could be beside the point if divergence from the modal
punishment assigned by lay people has little or no effect on the moral
credibility of the law, or if any such effect it does have does not lead to
serious real-world impacts in terms of compliance, cooperation, and related
desideratum. Studies 3, 4 and 5 in Putting Desert in Its Place tried to
ascertain the effect of departing from lay views on deserved punishment.
Study 3 found a small correlation between subjects' unwillingness to com-
ply with the law and the extent to which they disagreed with the maximum
sentences assigned to crimes in their respective jurisdictions." But whether
the reason for that disagreement was based on a perceived failure to
82. RBL, supra note 3, at 33I.
83. Of the 24 scenarios, only seven had a normal bell-curved distribution (measured via
kurtosis and skewness scores).
84. Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note i, at to2 (finding a "marginally signif-
icant correlation of o.i between dissatisfaction with the law and noncompliance" with
respect to the control group and a "statistically significant" correlation of.22 with respect
to the experimental group).
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implement desert or on a perceived failure to implement prevention was
not clear.8 5 Using different samples, Studies 4 A and 4 B found that expos-
ing subjects to "unjust" scenarios produced virtually no effect in terms of
reduced compliance or reduced willingness to cooperate with the author-
ities, even when the punishment described to the subjects was a very
significant departure from the punishment assigned to the identical sce-
narios by virtually all the subjects in Study 2.86 Study 5 found a very small
noncompliance effect based on newspaper stories about "unjust" sentences,
but that this effect dissipated quickly.8 7
RBL aim a number of criticisms at the methodology of these studies.
Most of these criticisms are well-taken, although probably none of them is
devastating. For Study 3, RBL note that every subject could have been
"imagining a different story" about how their jurisdiction's sentencing law
works.8 For instance, a subject might have expressed disagreement with
the maximum sentence structure in their jurisdiction but assumed that the
maximum sentence is rarely or never imposed, and thus, contrary to our
assumption, indicated satisfaction with their jurisdiction's law. Conversely,
a subject might have been relatively happy with the maximum sentence
structure of their jurisdiction but, again in the belief that those sentences
were rarely imposed, indicated displeasure with their jurisdiction's sentenc-
ing regime. However, the key question posed to the subjects involved in
this study asked whether "you agree with what you think your jurisdic-
tion's punishment is" for the crimes at issue.89 This language should have
(but admittedly may not have) minimized the methodological problem
that RBL identify.
In any event, RBL say that if the results of this study are valid, they
provide support for the proposition that departure from desert undermines
stated willingness to comply with the law.90 There are two problems with
this assertion. The first is that the correlation between dissatisfaction and
compliance was extremely low: dissatisfaction with a jurisdiction's punish-
ment scheme accounted for only i percent of the noncompliance effect in
85. Id. at o3.
86. Id. at 1o6 (Table 3).
87. Id. at 109 (Table 4).
88. RBL, supra note 3, at 339.
89. Survey form on file with author.
90. RBL, supra note 3, at340 ("Even despite the muddled measurers used here, the study
showed a moral credibility effect.").
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one group and only 4 percent in the other.91 Second, as we pointed out in
Putting Desert in Its Place, the reason for this effect was not clear. Study 3
did not attempt to ascertain why any noncompliance effect occurred, only
whether it did occur. Because only the results with respect to the second
group were statistically significant, and because that group was the one
which had been exposed to scenarios that included preventive factors in
connection with Studies i and 2, we conjectured that the second group may
have been more alert to the possibility that the sentencing regime in their
jurisdiction "does not provide enough flexibility to take into account these
[preventive] types of factors, which in turn increased both dissatisfaction
and noncompliance." 92 Admittedly, this hypothesis is speculative, but it
was the only explanation that we could come up with for the difference in
compliance scores between two groups that were equally diverse and were
otherwise exposed to the same prompts.
Using new samples, Studies 4A and 4 B tried to determine whether, in
fact, lay people are bothered by sentences that are consistent with desert but
that depart from preventive factors. In both studies, we provided one
experimental group with scenarios describing punishments that were dis-
proportionate to the desert-based terms we obtained in Study 2 (e.g., a very
long sentence for stealing a T-shirt, or a very short sentence for an aggra-
vated assault), and another experimental group with scenarios describing
enhanced or reduced sentences in a direction contrary to what preventive
factors would suggest (e.g., a dangerous offender was given a very light
sentence, whereas a nondangerous one was given a very heavy sentence).93
We were unable to obtain any statistically significant results between either
of these two experimental groups and the control group (which read sce-
narios involving more reasonable sentences) in terms of willingness to
comply or cooperate with the law, and concluded that "the relationship
between compliance and satisfaction with the substance of the criminal law
is complicated and difficult to predict."9 4
RBL's explanation for our null results is different. They suggest that our
scenarios were too "bland," because, unlike the analogous study conducted
91. See I DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 225 n.5 (2005) ("The square of the correlation coefficient
... is sometimes called the proportion of variance 'explained."').
92. Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note 1, at 103.
93. Id. at 104.
94. Id. at io8.
396 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW I VOL. 17 1 NO. 2 SPRING 2014
by Robinson, Goodwin, and Reisig (reported in an article entitled The
Disutility of Injustice9 5 ), we did not take our scenarios from "specific
real-world cases that produced dramatically unjust results."96 As RBL say,
"it takes some doing for researchers to create in an hour in a lab even
a nudge to the system's moral credibility."9 7
That is our essential point. Unless injustice is dramatic and routine
(Robinson, Goodwin, and Reisig gave their subjects seven dramatically
unjust real-world scenarios 98 ), even a nudge in lost credibility is difficult
to obtain. And "nudge" is the right word. On a 9-point Likert scale, the
difference that the authors of The Disutility of Injustice (hereafter, RGR)
obtained after exposure to these unjust scenarios was, on average, just over
one point in the direction of less willingness to be compliant and cooperative
with the system.9 9 Furthermore, this one-point-plus movement represented
a shift from the number on the scale indicating mild agreement-as opposed
to moderate or strong agreement-with compliant/cooperative attitudes, to
the scale number that indicated the subjects were "unsure" about their
attitudes toward compliance/cooperation. 100
Another important observation about these results is that, even if the
change in attitude reflected in RGR's study was both genuine and mean-
ingful, that change is not likely to translate into actual noncompliance. As
RGR noted, "Considerable research has shown that the extent to
which ... measures of attitude and intention predict behavior varies
greatly, depending on whether they specifically capture the context and
circumstances in which the relevant behaviors will be enacted."'0 RGR's
attitudinal measure commendably asked very specific questions aimed at
assessing their subjects "disillusionment" with the system, having to do
with the extent to which they would trust the criminal law's judgments
95. Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin, & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of
Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940 (2010).
96. RBL, supra note 3, at 342.
97. Id. at 342.
98. See Robinson, Goodwin, & Reisig, supra note 95, at 2031 (describing scenarios).
99. Id. at 2007 (Table 7) (displaying differences, in scores on eight questions evaluating
subjects' perception of the "moral credibility" of a hypothetical criminal justice system,
between a "low disillusionment" group given reasonable sentencing scenarios and a "high
disillusionment" group given unreasonable sentencing scenarios).
100. Id. at zoos (describing meaning of points on the scale).
101. Id. at 2008-9.
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about blameworthiness, report various types of low-level criminal activity,
and admit to failing to paying a bill.10 2 Research suggests that specificity of
this type improves the prediction of the specific behaviors described.103
Even so, the correlation between an expressed intention and actual behav-
ior is complicated by many factors and is often very low.' 0 4 Moreover, as
already noted, the majority of RGR's subjects who received the unjust
scenarios at worst tended to be merely "unsure" about whether they would
engage in behaviors showing disillusionment with the system. In other
words, even if statements on a survey do predict behavior, the behavior
being predicted in RGR's survey is ambiguous at best.
Finally, as Study 5 in Putting Desert in Its Place suggested, any disillu-
sionment that does occur from hearing about dramatic injustice dissipates
quickly. 0 5 This is not surprising. Events that are salient today become less
salient the day after. Distractions intervene. RBL state that this dissipating
effect is useful, because it means that the implementation of empirical desert
has a good chance of overcoming the disillusionment created by crime
control policies.' But one could also take from Study 5 the conclusion
that attempts to enhance moral credibility through empirical desert are not
needed if any disillusionment that such crime control policies create, and any
102. Id. at 1999 (Table 5) (describing questions).
103. Icek Ajzen & Martin Fishbein, Attitude-Behavior Relations: A Theoretical Review of
Empirical Research, 84 PSYCHoL. BULL. 888, 912 (1977) (after reviewing the available
research, finding that "[a] person's attitude has a consistently strong relation with his or her
behavior when it is directed at the same target and when it involves the same action.").
104. See, e.g., Allen E. Liska, A Critical Examination of the Causal Structure of the
Fishbein/Ajzen Attitude-Behavior Model, 47 Soc. PSYCH. Q. 61, 71 (1984) ("It is now clear
that [the] conceptual order of [the Ajzen/Fishbein model] was achieved by limiting the
subject matter of study to volitional behaviors (those which require no skills and social
cooperation), which immediately follow the formation of intentions (short-term planning)
and by assuming a simple (chain, additive and recursive) causal structure."); Richard P.
Bagozzi, The Self-Regulation ofAttitudes, Intentions and Behavior, 55 Soc. PsycH. Q. 178,
178 (1992) ("We argue that attitudes and subjective norms are not sufficient determinants of
intentions and that intentions are not a sufficient impetus for action, as maintained by
leading theories of attitude.").
105. Slobogin & Brinkley Rubinstein, supra note i, at 109 ("these findings suggest that
dissatisfaction with unjust legal rules and dispositions either does not last very long or does
not have a long-lasting effect on willingness to flout the law.").
Jo6. RBL, supra note 3, at 344 ("the reform agenda of empirical desert and moral
credibility is counting on the fact that the effect of earlier injustices and failures of justice
will fade with time.").
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tendency to misbehave that might follow from it, dissipates on its own. In
that case, a system based on individual prevention should be able to pursue
crime prevention within relatively broad parameters without worrying about
the criminogenic effects of ignoring desert.
CONCLUSION: PREVENTIVE JUSTICE
AND "CRIME CONTROL"
Preventive justice is based on the assumption, accepted by a wide range of
thinkers,'o 7 that the primary goal of the criminal justice system is to
prevent significant bodily harm and significant harm to property. If that
is the goal, then Robinson is right to call attention to the role adherence to
empirical desert can play in enhancing compliance with the law and coop-
eration with the authorities. But his description of that role is exaggerated.
Divergence from desert probably does not have significant negative effects
unless it is routine, dramatic, and becomes apparent to a large segment of
the public. That constellation of factors might exist in a regime that often
imposes punishment in the absence of antisocial conduct or consistently
metes out long sentences for minor misconduct, or in a criminal justice
system that, conversely, routinely fails to impose serious punishments for
serious crimes. But outside of these situations, any failure of the criminal
justice system to adhere to empirical desert should probably not be a major
concern even in the rare circumstances where it becomes general knowl-
edge. First, Robinson's own research suggests as much, given the extent of
injustice RGR needed to budge attitudes toward the system. 0 8 Second, the
research we reported in Putting Desert in Its Place indicates that, except
where very serious crimes are involved, lay subjects are comfortable with
substantial departures from desert if the resulting sentences are consistent
with individual prevention factors focused on risk.' 0 9 Third, even if neg-
ative attitudes toward the criminal justice system are caused by divergence
107. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 46 (1886) (stating that
crime prevention is "the chief and only universal purpose of punishment," while also stating
that "criminal liability... is founded on blameworthiness."); Husak, supra note L4, at 1201-2
(the "most plausible" objective of a system of penal justice is "crime prevention.").
1o8. See supra text accompanying notes 95-100.
t09. See supra text accompanying notes 57-75.
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from desert, those attitudes are seldom likely to result in noncompliant or
noncooperative behavior.' 10
In both Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, and Limiting Retribu-
tivism: A Reply and The Disutility ofInjustice, Robinson and his coauthors
rightly express concern about what they call "crime control" policies. They
provide six examples of such policies: three-strikes laws, harsh punishment
of drug offenses, expansive juvenile transfer practices, the abolition of the
insanity defense, strict liability for regulatory offenses, and homicide-level
sentences imposed on felony murderers and their accomplices." Robin-
son and his colleagues assert that "every one of these doctrines" is based on
preventive rationales rather than desert.11 2 That assumption can be ques-
tioned. For instance, heavily enhanced penalties for recidivists have been
justified on the ground that a second or third offense is more blameworthy
because it demonstrates disrespectful nose-thumbing toward the law.' 13
The federal sentencing laws have institutionalized an array of mandatory
minimum sentences for drug offenses based, in large part, on retributive
considerations." 4 Expansion of adult jurisdiction over juvenile offenders
has often been rationalized as a matter of just desert." 5 The states that
abolished the insanity defense have replaced it with the lack-of-mens rea
alternative, which at least one court has held is consistent with culpability
principles." 6 The United States Supreme Court has upheld the imposition
no. See supra text accompanying notes 1o-6.
In. RBL, supra note 3, at 357; RGR, supra note 95, at 1983-94.
112. RBL, supra note 3, at 357.
u3. See JULIAN V. ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: EXPLORING
COMMUNITY AND OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 68, 163, 171-74, 183-84 (ZOo8) (stating that
the "legal discourse surrounding the punishment of repeat offenders is suffused with re-
ferences to culpability" and describing studies indicating that desert is a significant reason
for public endorsement of recidivist statutes, although also noting that public support for
such statutes declines "as consideration of previous convictions swamp the seriousness of the
crime").
114. See Jane L. Froyd, Safety- Valve Failure: Low Level Drug Offenders and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 147l, 1488 (zooo) (stating that, in the federal
context, the "goal of retribution or 'just deserts' was the most commonly voiced reason for
instituting mandatory minimum penalties" on drug offenders.).
n. See Alfred S. Regnery, Getting Away with Murder: Why the juvenile Justice System
Needs an Overhaul, 34 Poucy REV. 65, 66 (zooo) (stating that juvenile offenders are
"criminals who happen to be young, not children who happen to be criminal.").
n6. State v. Herrera, 859 P.2d 359,369 (Utah, 1995) ("It can be reasonably concluded that
those who understand and appreciate the fact that they are killing another are more
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of "strict liability" on individuals who violate regulatory prohibitions only
if they are not "powerless" to abide by the prohibition, a caveat that
resonates with desert.' 17 And the felony murder rule has been robustly
supported on retributive grounds."' I agree with Robinson (and Robin-
son's subjects"'9) that all of these criminal law doctrines reflect skewed
views of desert. But the point here is that desert-based rationales continue
to be cited as justification for each.
Even if, however, these doctrines are all based on a prevention rationale,
that rationale is either not focused on individual prevention factors or is
based on a seriously flawed implementation of those factors. The most
likely utilitarian rationale for the various doctrines that RBL criticize is
general deterrence, not incapacitation, specific deterrence, or rehabilitation.
This fact is obvious with respect to harsh drug laws, prosecution of juve-
niles in adult court, abolition of the insanity defense, strict liability for
regulatory crimes, and felony murder. If these doctrines are at all plausible
from a utilitarian perspective, it is because they aim to scare particular
groups away from committing crime. Virtually by definition, they are not
based on individual prevention factors because they are meant to apply to
the entire target group, regardless of the specific risk individuals within that
group pose.
Only the first type of "crime control" doctrine that RBL identify-
three-strikes laws and other enhancement statutes that are based on the
specific crimes committed by the offender-might as easily be justified by
'culpable' than those whose delusions carry them even further away from reality."). In any
event, limiting the insanity defense seems an odd way of accomplishing crime control, since
insanity acquittees tend to spend as long or longer in (hospital) confinement than those
convicted of similar offenses. See GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS
FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS
203-4 (3d ed. 2007).
117. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673 (975) ("The theory upon which responsible
corporate agents are held criminally accountable for 'causing' violations of the Act permits
a claim that a defendant was 'powerless' to prevent or correct the violation to 'be raised
defensively at a trial on the merits."').
n8. David Crump, Reconsidering the Felony Murder Rule in Light of Modern Criticisms:
Doesn't the Conclusion Depend Upon the Particular Rule at Issue? 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
Po'Y n55, u62 (2009) ("the [felony murder] rule's most important purpose is enhancing
the connection between moral blameworthiness and the imposition of criminal liability.").
up9. RGR, supra note 3, at 1972 (Table 4) (comparing sentences imposed by study
subjects and by courts in the actual cases).
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incapacitation or specific deterrence as on general deterrence grounds. 120
But if so, just as these laws represent a skewed view of desert, they are based
on a skewed view of individual prevention. From a risk management
perspective, it is probably justifiable to keep a three-time killer or rapist
in prison longer than a person who has committed only one murder or
rape. But, as Robinson himself has admitted,121 an individual prevention
regime would not countenance putting someone like William Rummel-
the three-time minor fraudster that RBL highlight as an example of the
prevention model gone amok1 22-in prison for life (a result the Supreme
Court unfortunately upheld).123 Indeed, even a year-long sentence is prob-
ably uncalled for in Rummel's case; a few months in prison as a specific
deterrent, combined with restitution, job training, a restorative justice
process, and/or cognitive social learning strategies will often be effective
preventive techniques for offenders like Rummel.124
Similar comments can be made about the irrationality, from a risk
management perspective, of drug sentencing laws (most drug offenders
do not commit violent crime and probably should be processed through
drug court or some other treatment program' 2 5), transfer laws (which
disregard research indicating that even violent juveniles can be successfully
rehabilitated in relatively short-term, community-based programs' 26),
120. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. ii, z6-27 (2003) ("We have long viewed both inca-
pacitation and deterrence as rationales for recidivism statutes.").
121. Robinson, supra note 20, at 1456 (stating that a statute explicitly providing for
preventive detention for a third minor fraud offense "would be unlikely to find support in
any political quarter" and "would be preposterous on its face in a civil preventive detention
system.").
122. RBL, supra note 3, at 319.
123. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
124. See generally, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl LeroJonson, Rehabilitation and Treatment
Programs, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 293-344 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds.,
zon1) (describing research on the types of rehabilitation programs that are most likely to be
effective at reducing recidivism among a wide range of offenders and concluding that "by
showing concern for the welfare of offenders-with the exchange being that investing in the
wayward advances public safety. . . -rehabilitation provides one of the few rationales for
not imposing unnecessary pains on those under correctional supervision").
125. See generally, D. Banks & D. Gottfredson, The Effects of Drug Treatment and
Supervision on Time to Rearrest among Drug Treatment Court Participants, 33 J. DRUG ISSUES
385, 397 (2004) (finding that drug court participation reduced recidivism from 8o% to 40%).
126. See generally, SCOTT W. HENGGELER ET AL., MULTISYSTEMIC TREATMENT OF
ANTIsoCIAL BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 252-54 (1998).
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people found insane (who should be civilly committed based on risk, as in
fact happens in virtually every state' 2 7), accidental or negligent regulatory
violators (who are probably sufficiently specifically deterred through com-
pensatory and punitive fines128 ), and felony murderers (who vary widely in
terms of risk, especially if, as in RGR's felony murder scenarios, they are
unarmed at the time of the felony or the underlying felony is selling the
victim a drug that leads to an overdosel 29). Compared to the questionable
preventive effect of empirical desert, which in any event is aimed solely at
improving compliance among the general population, preventive justice
focuses on programs that can be robustly investigated in terms of their
effect on recidivism and that are focused directly on offenders.
Nor is there good reason to believe this type of preventive justice would
result in greater deprivations of liberty than the empirical desert disposi-
tions that Robinson would prefer. In RGR's The Disutility ofInjustice, the
subjects were asked to impose sentences in scenarios exemplifying the six
"crime control" situations described above. Although the sentences they
chose were, on average, much more lenient than those imposed in the
actual cases on which they were based, they were still quite substantial:
1.1 years and3 years for scenarios involving a third minor felony; 1.9 years for
marijuana possession and 4.2 years for cocaine possession; 19.2 years for
a juvenile who accidentally killed a teacher; 16.5 years and 26.3 years for
killings committed by individuals who are seriously mentally ill; 9.7
months for an accidental regulatory crime; and 10.7 years for felony murder
where the underlying felony was selling cocaine and 17.7 years for com-
plicity during a felony murder.130 My own sense is that most of these
sentences are "harsh"; RGR themselves state that many of these sentences
127. SeeJones v. United States, 463 U.S. 35 4 (1983) (upholding preventive confinement of
insanity acquittees).
128. Even intentional regulatory violations might best be handled through restitution,
delicensing, disbarment, restructuring of the business model, compliance programs, and
other means of preventing the perpetrator from obtaining another opportunity to violate the
law. Cf Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 323 (2003) (comparing punishment of white collar criminals
and street criminals and arguing that a true assessment of the costs of the punitive approach
might lead to adoption of more "problem-solving" and "community" courts).
129. RGR, supra note 95, at 2030 (describing cocaine overdose and accomplice-during-
burglary scenarios).
530. Id. at 1972 (Table 4).
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"seem[] quite punitive."131 However, in their article in this journal, RBL
state, "Literally by definition empirical desert cannot produce 'unusually
harsh' sentences," adding that "empirical desert is the one and only among
all utilitarian distributive principles that can never produce harsh
sentences." 1 32
That may be so from a retributive perspective (it would be interesting to
hear the reaction of deontological theorists to these statements). Whether
these sentences are harsh as a matter of desert is not my concern, however.
The important point is that these sentences are unusually harsh from an
individual prevention perspective. 13 3 Put another way, these types of sen-
tences, focused solely on desert, are unlikely to be optimal when the
objective is crime prevention. If so, they fail to achieve the primary goal
of the criminal justice system.
131. Id. at 1974 (also noting that the subjects' sentences were "often double or triple the
punishment imposed in real-world practice").
132. RBL, supra note 3, at 357 (emphasis in original).
133. RBL state that the word harsh "has only a desert meaning," because it is defined as
"repugnant or roughly offensive to the feelings; severe, rigorous, cruel, rude, rough,
unfeeling." RBL, supra note 3, at n.i3z. Just as I dispute their equation of the word "justice"
with desert, I reject their attempt to hijack the word "harsh." I find many of the sentences
imposed by RGR's subjects to be repugnant, offensive, severe, rough, and unfeeling because
they disregard an offender's ability to get back on track and ignore more effective crime
control mechanisms, even if they do achieve "desert."
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